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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In September, 1994, bus driver Joseph G. Dykes filed 
suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") and the Transport 
Worker's Union of Philadelphia, AFL-CIO, Local 234 ("Local 234"). 
In his two-count complaint, Dykes alleged that his constitutional 
rights were violated when his SEPTA supervisors asked him to 
submit to body fluids testing in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion and that SEPTA and Local 234 conspired to deprive him 
of due process in connection with the grievance proceedings which 
followed his discharge.   
 This appeal requires that we determine whether the 
district court erred in dismissing Dykes' complaint for failure 
to state a cause of action.  In making this determination we 
revisit and extend our opinion in Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807 
(3d Cir. 1991), to conclude that, pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreement, whether reasonable suspicion exists in a 
given case is not a question of law under the Fourth Amendment, 
but is instead a question of fact to be resolved during the 
course of the grievance/arbitration process.  We also hold that 
where an adequate grievance/arbitration procedure is in place and 
is followed, a plaintiff has received the due process to which he 
3 
is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Because we conclude 
that Dykes has failed to allege a constitutional violation 
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we will affirm the orders of 
the district court. 
       
I. 
 The allegations set forth in the complaint are 
straightforward.1  On July 13, 1993, Dykes, a bus driver employed 
by SEPTA and represented by Local 234, drove a SEPTA bus along 
his regular route.  At some point during the trip, SEPTA 
supervisors boarded the bus, ordered Dykes out of the driver's 
seat, and asked that he submit to body fluids tests designed to 
detect the presence of drugs and alcohol.  Dykes refused to 
submit to those tests, and, as a result, was fired.  Following 
Dykes' discharge, Local 234 pursued three levels of grievance 
proceedings.  At each stage, it was determined that the tests 
requested were based on reasonable suspicion and Dykes' discharge 
was upheld.  The union did not submit the matter to arbitration. 
 On September 6, 1994, Dykes filed a civil complaint 
consisting of two counts, both of which were based upon 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  In Count One, Dykes alleged that SEPTA deprived "him of 
                                                           
1
 In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a cause of action, we apply the same standard as 
did the district court, accepting the allegations of the 
complaint as true and construing those allegations, in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.  Wisniewski v. Johns Manville 
Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 1985).  This standard does not 
vary where the action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, 
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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his Fourth Amendment Right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures."  He explained that "[t]he supervisors who ordered 
[him] to submit to a body fluids test had no reasonable basis for 
suspecting that [he] was under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol."  Count Two of the complaint, directed at SEPTA and 
Local 234, alleged that Dykes was deprived of a property interest 
in his employment without due process of law as required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Specifically, Dykes challenged the role of 
SEPTA and Local 234 in the post-termination grievance 
proceedings.  Local 234 was said to have "allow[ed] SEPTA . . . 
to get away with what [the Union] knew to be violations of 
plaintiff's due process rights even though [the Union] had the 
power to prevent such violations and a duty to try to do so." 
Dykes also claimed that Local 234 failed to obtain and present 
meaningful evidence and discouraged Dykes from presenting 
evidence in his own behalf.  The Union was said to have "aided 
and abetted" and "acted in concert with SEPTA in effecting the 
deprivation of plaintiff's due process rights." 
 On October 7, 1994, SEPTA filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).  Local 234 
filed a similar motion on November 14, 1994.  By Order dated 
December 19, 1994, the district court dismissed Dykes' complaint 
as to SEPTA and, on December 29, 1994, entered an order 
dismissing Count II of the complaint.2  This appeal followed. 
                                                           
2
 The district court did not issue opinions explaining 
the deficiencies in the complaint. 
5 
 The sole issue before us concerns the adequacy of the 
complaint.  In order for a plaintiff to state a cause of action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must allege "that the defendant has 
deprived him of a right secured by the `Constitution and laws' of 
the United States . . . and that the defendant deprived him of 
this Constitutional right `under the color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or 
Territory'."  Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144. 150 
(1970).  We evaluate each count of Dykes' complaint with 
reference to this standard. 
  
II. 
 In Count One, Dykes alleged that "the actions of 
defendant SEPTA . . . deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures" and that "in 
denying [Dykes] his Fourth Amendment rights, defendant SEPTA - a 
state agency - was acting under color of state law."  In 
addition, Dykes alleged that "Defendant [Local 234] is a labor 
organization which . . . -- at all times relevant to this action 
-- was [Dykes'] exclusive representative . . . for the purposes 
of collective bargaining and pursuing grievances with respect to 
the terms and conditions of . . . employment"; further, that 
SEPTA had "no reasonable basis for suspecting that [he] was under 
the influence of alcohol and that the proposed search which 
deprived [him] of his Fourth amendment Rights [was] done in 
accordance with policies or practices of SEPTA. . . ." 
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 SEPTA filed a motion to dismiss, attaching a copy of 
the 1992-1995 collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") made 
between SEPTA and Local 2343.  Article XII § 1203.I(a) of the CBA 
governs when drug and alcohol testing of SEPTA personnel based 
upon reasonable suspicion may be undertaken and defines what 
constitutes reasonable suspicion.4  SEPTA asserts that the issue 
                                                           
3
 Dykes argues that we may not look to the CBA in 
reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion.  This argument ignores our decision 
in Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated 
Industries, Inc..  There, we held that  
 
A court may consider an undisputedly 
authentic document that a defendant attaches 
as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the 
plaintiff's claims are based on the document. 
Otherwise, a plaintiff with a legally 
deficient claim could survive a motion to 
dismiss simply by failing to attach a 
dispositive document upon which it relied. 
 
998 F.2d at 1196 (citations omitted).  This holding is not 
inconsistent with "Rule 12(b)(6)'s requirement that a motion to 
dismiss be converted to a summary judgment motion if a court 
considers matter outside the pleadings . . . .  When a complaint 
relies on a document, however, the plaintiff obviously is on 
notice of the contents of the document and the need for a chance 
to refute evidence is greatly diminished."  Id. at 1196-97.  
 
 Clearly, this matter falls within the rule announced in 
Pension Benefit Guaranty as Dykes' complaint, while framed in 
constitutional terms, grows out of an alleged violation of the 
CBA.   
4
 The CBA, at Article XII, § 203, provides as follows: 
 
[SEPTA] may require an employee to submit to 
drug and alcohol testing on a reasonable 
suspicion basis where a supervisor trained in 
the detection of drug and alcohol use can 
articulate and substantiate specific 
behavioral performance or contemporaneous 
physical indicators of probable drug or 
alcohol use.  [SEPTA] and the Union 
understand such indicators to include such of 
the following as would reasonably lead the 
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of whether reasonable suspicion exists is an issue of contract 
interpretation which must be addressed pursuant to the grievance 
process.  Accordingly, Dykes allegedly is bound by the finding, 
made in each step of the grievance process, that SEPTA acted on 
reasonable suspicion in requesting that he submit to drug and 
alcohol testing.  The crux of these contentions is that Dykes was 
not subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment or, consequently, within the 
scope of section 1983.   
 
A. 
 Cases interpreting the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
establish that drug testing of public employees may raise search 
and seizure issues.  Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 
489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).  It is equally clear that the Fourth 
Amendment applies only to unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.  What is reasonable "depends on all of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
supervisor to conclude that drug or alcohol 
use is a contributory factor:  Behavior or 
actions which differ from normal behavior or 
actions under the circumstances, 
inappropriate or disoriented behavior and 
incidents involving serious violations of 
safety or operating rules and practices. 
 
Article XII, § 1203II(a) provides that "[f]ailure to submit to a 
drug and alcohol test properly required . . . is a dischargeable 
offense."  The grievance procedure designed to test the 
circumstances surrounding drug and alcohol testing is set forth 
in Article II of the CBA.  While Article XII does not refer 
specifically to the grievance procedure detailed in Article II, 
the parties agree that the grievance procedures applied to the 
situation presented here.   
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the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the 
nature of the search or seizure itself."  Id.  Courts are 
required to "balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on 
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the 
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion."  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). 
 The Supreme Court has stated that the very fact of 
individualized suspicion goes far toward making a search 
reasonable where the government has a legitimate interest in 
confirming the alleged violation.  See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623; 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968, 975 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 In this case, where Dykes operated a transit bus, there 
is no question that SEPTA had a legitimate interest in developing 
and administering a drug and alcohol testing program.  In fact, 
in Transport Workers' Local 234 v. SEPTA, 884 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 
1988), we held that even random testing of SEPTA drivers was 
constitutionally justified given "SEPTA's extensive evidence of a 
severe drug abuse problem among its operating employees."  Id. at 
711.  
 What we confront here, then, is not a policy alleged to 
be unconstitutional; the parties agree that the SEPTA suspicion-
based testing policy is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Dykes alleges, instead, that the policy was not 
followed; SEPTA sought to have him submit to testing in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion.  It is SEPTA's violation of its 
9 
own policy that allegedly renders the proposed search 
unreasonable.   
 
B. 
 Ultimately, the question of whether a particular search 
is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is not a 
question of fact.  "Unlike a determination of `reasonableness' in 
ordinary tort cases and some other contexts, this balancing 
process presents a question of law. . . ."  Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 
F.2d 807, 822 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2281 
(1992).  In order to resolve the reasonableness question 
presented here, we must first examine the more narrow question of 
whether there was reasonable suspicion underlying SEPTA's request 
that Dykes submit to testing.  If there was reasonable suspicion, 
and SEPTA, therefore, complied with the terms of its drug and 
alcohol testing policy, there is no Fourth Amendment issue; the 
policy, evaluated against the background of precedent, is 
reasonable in the broad constitutional sense.  If SEPTA's request 
that Dykes be tested was founded on reasonable suspicion, Count 
One of Dykes' complaint was properly dismissed.   
 The dispositive issue in this case is, therefore, 
whether SEPTA had reasonable suspicion upon which to test Dykes. 
Relying on our en banc decision in Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807 
(3d Cir. 1991), we conclude that this question is one of fact to 
be determined during the course of the grievance process and that 
the finding reached during this process is binding upon the 
reviewing court.   
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 In order to explain this conclusion, we explore the 
facts of Bolden in some detail.  In 1986, Bolden, a SEPTA 
custodian, was involved in an altercation with a SEPTA bus driver 
and was discharged.  This discharge was pursued through three 
levels of grievance proceedings with Bolden represented by Local 
234.  In June, 1987, an arbitration panel ruled that Bolden was 
entitled to reinstatement and back pay. 
 Between the time that Bolden was discharged and the 
time that he was to return to work, SEPTA unilaterally instituted 
a new drug testing policy which required that employees returning 
to work after certain absences be tested for drugs.  Unions 
representing SEPTA workers challenged the legality of this 
return-to-work testing.  The district court found this type of 
testing unconstitutional, Transport Workers' Local 234 v. SEPTA, 
678 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Pa. 1988), and we affirmed.  Transport 
Workers' Local 234 v. SEPTA, 863 F.2d 1110 (3d. Cir. 1988), 
vacated, 492 U.S. 902, reaffirmed, 884 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Commenting on return-to-work testing, we wrote: 
SEPTA must justify its return-to-work testing 
on the basis of some particularized 
suspicion.  It has, however, failed to 
present any evidence that the employees 
returning to work present some unique risk 
directly related to drug or alcohol use. 
Thus, SEPTA has not shown that this aspect of 
its program is initially justified or that 
testing of all employees returning after an 
absence for whatever cause has any 
relationship to the articulated need for the 
program. 
863 F.2d at 1122. 
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 While the Unions' suit was pending, but prior to the 
court decisions in this matter, Bolden was reinstated.  Under the 
testing policy then in force, Bolden submitted to a return-to-
work drug test.  He tested positive for marijuana and was again 
discharged.  Once again, the Union initiated grievance 
proceedings on Bolden's behalf.  At the end of the three-step 
process but prior to arbitration and prior to resolution of the 
pending suit challenging return-to-work drug testing, SEPTA and 
the Union reached a settlement regarding Bolden's second 
discharge.  Under the terms of the settlement, Bolden was 
authorized to return to work provided that he  
(1) enter SEPTA's Employee Assistance Program 
and present evidence of successful substance 
abuse treatment, agree to an "aftercare 
program," submit to a body fluids test before 
returning to work, and remain subject to 
unannounced follow-up tests or (2) submit to 
a body fluids test and, if he passed, meet 
with a substance abuse counsellor and remain 
subject to unannounced follow-up testing for 
six months. 
 
Id. at 811.  Under either settlement option, Bolden was required 
to submit to body fluids testing.  Bolden declined to return to 
work on these terms and filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§1983, alleging violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  Following a jury trial, judgment was entered for Bolden 
on the Fourth Amendment claim. 
 On appeal, we affirmed the order of the district court 
with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, holding first that 
return-to-work testing could not be justified under the balancing 
test outlined in Skinner:  "SEPTA has no special need to subject 
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Bolden to a drug test based on any dangers presented by his job." 
Bolden, 953 F.2d at 824.  We also rejected SEPTA's claim that 
return-to-work testing was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
because Bolden had, upon his original reinstatement, voluntarily 
consented to drug testing as a matter of law.  We found, however, 
"greater merit in SEPTA's reliance on the settlement it reached 
with local 234 following Bolden's discharge for drug use."  Id. 
at 825. 
 While we held that the grievance settlement did not 
preclude Bolden's section 1983 claim under the doctrines of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel, we found that the grievance 
settlement was binding upon Bolden because "a union such as 
Bolden's may validly consent to terms and conditions of 
employment, such as submission to drug testing, that implicate 
employees' Fourth Amendment rights."  Id. at 826. 
 We noted that unions are given statutory authority to 
make binding contractual commitments regarding the terms and 
conditions of employment.  "Under the Pennsylvania Public 
Employees Relations Act (PERA), Pa. Stat. tit. 43 § 1101.606 
(Purdon 1991), a union is the exclusive collective bargaining 
representative for all of the employees in the unit, and 
therefore the union, in entering into a collective bargaining 
agreement, may agree to terms and conditions that are 
contractually binding on all of the employees."  Id.  We also 
reviewed caselaw generated by the Supreme Court and our sister 
courts of appeals recognizing that "a union's authority as 
exclusive bargaining agent necessarily entails some restrictions 
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on constitutional rights that individual employees would 
otherwise enjoy."  Id.  Finally, we recognized that "[t]he 
National Labor Relations Board has held that drug testing is a 
mandatory subject of [collective] bargaining."  953 F.2d at 827. 
 Most importantly for purposes of reviewing Dykes' 
claims, we held that certain factual questions may be 
conclusively determined through collective bargaining, even where 
resolution of those questions could "have important implications 
under the Fourth Amendment."  Id. at 828.  We also made clear 
that determination of these factual issues precludes their being 
litigated further: 
If individual public employees may litigate 
such questions despite the resolution reached 
through collective bargaining, the utility of 
collective bargaining with respect to drug 
testing would be greatly diminished.  In sum, 
we conclude that a public employee union 
acting as exclusive bargaining agent may 
consent to drug testing on behalf of the 
employees it represents. 
 
Id.  This consent may be explicit, i.e., an express term in the 
collective bargaining agreement, or implicit, derived from 
practice, usage and custom.  "[I]f the union agrees, or if 
binding arbitration establishes, that the collective bargaining 
agreement impliedly authorizes drug testing, individual employees 
[and the court] are bound by this interpretation unless they can 
show a breach of the duty of fair representation."  Id.  When we 
applied these principles to Bolden's case, we concluded that when 
the union, as Bolden's exclusive bargaining agent, pursued 
grievance procedures and ultimately entered into a settlement 
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with SEPTA which mandated drug testing for Bolden, "the 
settlement had the same effect under labor law and under the 
Fourth Amendment as if Bolden himself consented to such future 
drug testing."  953 F.2d at 829.  Bolden, even though he never 
personally ratified the settlement, was bound by its terms and 
could not recover damages for the period of time following the 
settlement. 
 Our holding in Bolden establishes that even where a 
drug testing policy has been held to be constitutionally infirm, 
a public employee may not pursue a civil rights suit based upon 
that infirmity where his union and his employer agree to operate 
under that policy. 
 
C. 
 While Dykes' case differs from Bolden in some 
significant respects, we believe that Bolden sets forth the 
principles which govern the outcome of this case.  Unlike in 
Bolden, the issue here is not SEPTA's policy per se.  As we have 
explained, the policy, as written, raises no Fourth Amendment 
concerns.  The issue for Dykes is whether the policy was 
followed, i.e., was there reasonable suspicion as required by the 
CBA?  The issue for us is even more basic:  is the existence of 
reasonable suspicion a question of law for the courts or one of 
fact appropriately resolved in grievance proceedings? 
 We believe that under the CBA, both in the details of 
the drug testing policy where reasonable suspicion is defined and 
in the applicable grievance procedures, it should have been clear 
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to all parties that this question would be considered and 
resolved in the grievance proceedings.  At oral argument, counsel 
for SEPTA represented, without challenge, that the question of 
reasonable suspicion is regularly considered and resolved through 
the grievance and arbitration process.  We view the issue of 
reasonable suspicion as one of fact which, like the question of 
which jobs are "safety-sensitive," is best left to resolution in 
the grievance process.   
 In sum, we agree with SEPTA that whether reasonable 
suspicion exists in a given case is an issue involving 
interpretation of the CBA and that we "must defer to this 
interpretation of the agreement unless the employee can show that 
the union has breached its duty of fair representation. . . ." 
Id.  There has been no such allegation here. 
 Because the question of reasonable suspicion was not 
resolved in Dykes' favor in any step of the grievance process, we 
find that the proposed search was reasonable.  The allegations in 
the complaint, therefore, are not sufficient to support a Fourth 
Amendment claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 
III. 
 We next address the adequacy of the claims set forth in 
Count II of Dykes' complaint.  This count, directed against both 
SEPTA and Local 234, alleges that Dykes was deprived of a 
property interest in his job without due process of law as 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment when SEPTA failed to accord 
him "a meaningful opportunity to be heard with respect to the 
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discharge."  Local 234 is alleged to have "aided and abetted and 
acted in concert with SEPTA in effecting the deprivation of 
Dykes' due process rights."5  We will not focus upon whether the 
allegations set forth in Count II are sufficient to allege a 
conspiracy bringing Local 234, as a private actor, within the 
ambit of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We need not reach the issue of 
conspiracy because we conclude that Dykes' complaint fails to 
allege a cognizable violation of his due process rights. 
 
A. 
 In order to state a section 1983 claim based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Dykes must allege that he was deprived of a 
property interest under color of state law without due process. 
For purposes of our analysis, we assume that Dykes has alleged 
facts sufficient to establish that he had a contractual 
employment relationship with SEPTA and that the relationship 
created a property interest subject to Fourteenth Amendment 
protection.  We also assume that Dykes was deprived of that 
interest when he was discharged for failing to submit to body 
fluids testing.  Our focus, then, rests upon the question of due 
process.  "We must bear in mind that no single model of 
procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is 
dictated by the Due Process Clause."  Kremer v. Chemical 
Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 (1982).  "[D]ue process is 
                                                           
5
 Dykes does not claim that the procedures established 
are inadequate per se or that additional procedures are required. 
The thrust of his complaint is that SEPTA and Local 234 acted to 
make a "sham" of the procedures in place. 
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flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands."  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334 (1976) (citation omitted).  The complaint establishes 
that Dykes had available to him a three step grievance process 
which could have been followed by arbitration.  The grievance 
process was exhausted and, when the union determined not to carry 
the matter to arbitration, Dykes did not pursue a state court 
action alleging breach of the duty of fair representation. 
 
B. 
 We have held that under the Pennsylvania Public 
Employee Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 101.101 et seq., 
federal labor law governs a challenge to procedures followed in 
the termination of a public employee.  See Crilly v. SEPTA, 529 
F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 1976).  If a public employee believes that the 
grievance process was defective, he may seek relief available 
under state law.  Once an employee establishes that a 
[U]nion has acted in bad faith towards its 
member[,] . . . the Court of Common Pleas 
sitting in equity may order completion of the 
arbitration procedure . . . .  Under this 
procedure a wrongfully discharged employee 
receives precisely the treatment all the 
employees in the unit are entitled to under 
the collective bargaining agreement. 
Martino v. T.W.U., Local 234, 505 Pa. 391, 409-410 (1984). 
 Where a due process claim is raised against a public 
employer, and grievance and arbitration procedures are in place, 
we have held that those procedures satisfy due process 
requirements "even if the hearing conducted by the Employer . . . 
18 
[was] inherently biased."  Jackson v. Temple University, 721 F.2d 
931 (3d Cir. 1983).  
 In Jackson, a public employee filed suit pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his due process rights were infringed 
by the biased nature of the grievance hearings conducted by 
Temple University following his discharge and by the Union's 
refusal to bring the matter to arbitration.  We affirmed the 
district court's dismissal of the section 1983 claim, agreeing 
with the district court that no precedent, "binding or 
otherwise," has "recognized a section 1983 action where a union 
has refused to take to arbitration an employee's claim against a 
public employer."  721 F.2d at 933 n.1.  We noted that  
[t]he Union, as the sole and exclusive 
bargaining representative had the ultimate 
power to make a fair and responsible 
determination as to whether it would invoke 
the arbitration proceeding available under 
the collective bargaining agreement.  The 
right to proceed to arbitration provided 
. . . an adequate due process safeguard even 
if the hearing conducted by the Employer 
earlier had been inherently biased. 
 
Id. at 933.  Finally, we stated that, "[t]he right to arbitrate 
provided . . . essentially the same due process safeguards which 
would have been available through an unbiased hearing.  There is 
no evidence suggesting that the arbitration proceeding would have 
been biased. . . .  Therefore, there is no due process violation 
in this case."  Id. at 933 n.2. 
 Our opinion in Jackson was relied upon by our sister 
court in Armstrong v. Meyers, 964 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1992). 
There a discharged university employee filed suit pursuant to 
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section 1983, alleging that he had been deprived of property 
without due process of law.  In affirming a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that, "A public employer may meet its 
obligation to provide due process through grievance procedures 
established in a collective bargaining agreement, provided, of 
course, that those procedures satisfy due process."  Id. at 950. 
The court then turned to the following balancing test established 
by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.  In 
order to determine whether a particular procedure meets due 
process requirements, three factors must be considered: 
First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
 
Applying these factors in the public employee context, our sister 
court of appeals recognized that an employee's interest in 
retaining his job is "substantial." 
However, the risk of an erroneous 
determination in the grievance/arbitration 
procedure is not large, and the value of 
additional or substitute procedures is not 
great.  Grievance/arbitration procedures are 
a universally accepted method of resolving 
employment disputes, included in countless 
collective bargaining agreements.  Although 
[the] union could and did decide not to take 
[the employee's] claim to arbitration, it did 
so under a duty of fair representation, and 
may be sued for beach of that duty if its 
20 
"conduct toward a member of the collective 
bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, 
or in bad faith." 
 
964 F.2d at 950 (citation omitted).  In holding that the 
grievance/arbitration procedures in place were adequate to meet 
the demands of due process, the court recognized "the strong 
public and private interest in maintaining an effective 
grievance/arbitration process to settle disputes between 
employers and employees."  Id. at 951. 
 We are convinced that the reasoning in Armstrong v. 
Meyers applies with equal force in this case.  Even where, as 
here, a plaintiff alleges that the defendants acted in concert to 
deprive him both of a meaningful hearing and of arbitration, we 
believe that the administrative process in place has incorporated 
safeguards adequate to resolve these allegations in a manner 
consistent with the demands of due process.6  Significantly, 
                                                           
6
 In so holding, we re-confirm our agreement with the 
many courts holding that grievance procedures outlined in 
collective bargaining agreements can satisfy due process 
requirements.  See Wallace v. Tilley, 41 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(grievance procedure outlined in collective bargaining agreement 
can satisfy due process even in cases where public employee has 
bee discharged); Buttitta v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1198, 1206 
(7th Cir. 1993) (due process satisfied where police officer had 
access to post-deprivation grievance procedure under collective 
bargaining agreement); Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trustees of Conn. 
State Univ., 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1988) (hearing rights 
available to discharged professor under the collective bargaining 
agreement fully satisfied procedural due process even where there 
were unsubstantiated claims of bias); Lewis v. Hillsborough 
Transit Authority, 726 F.2d 664, 667 (11th Cir. 1983) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984) (grievance procedure, 
if utilized, could eliminate a constitutional violation); Ash v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Woodhaven School Dist., 699 F.2d 822, 827 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (grievance procedures satisfied minimum requirements 
of due process).  
21 
Dykes could have asked a court of common pleas to order 
arbitraton pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, 
thereby assuring him of the due process to which he was entitled. 
Because he chose not to do so, Dykes is unable to prove a 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by SEPTA or by Local 234.  We 
conclude, therefore, that Count II of Dykes' complaint was 
appropriately dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.7     
IV. 
 Because we find that the district court properly 
applied Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in dismissing both counts of 
Dykes' complaint, we will affirm the orders of the district 
court.  
                                                           
7
 While Dykes elected to appeal the dismissal of the 
complaint rather than seek leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15, this fact alone does not preclude amendment of the complaint. 
Dist. Council 47, American Federation v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 
316 (3d Cir. 1986).  This is not a situation, however, where the 
complaint has been dismissed for lack of specificity or some 
other readily curable defect.  Given the facts of this case and 
the law as we have stated it, amendment of the complaint will not 
result in its being found sufficient to withstand a renewed 
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
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